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A b s t r a c t  
- 
Many m a r k e t i n g  models  u s e  v a r i a n t s  of  t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p :  
Market  s h a r e  e q u a l s  m a r k e t i n g  e f f o r t  d i v i d e d  by t o t a l  
m a r k e t i n g  e f f o r t .  Al though  t h e  r e l a t i o n  c a n  be assumed 
d i r e c t l y ,  c e r t a i n  i n s i g h t  i s  g a i n e d  by d e r i v i n g  i t  f rom 
more f u n d a m e n t a l  a s s u m p t i o n s  a s  f o l l o w s .  F o r  a  g i v e n  
cus tomer  g r o u p ,  e a c h  c o m p e t i t i v e  s e l l e r  h a s  a  r e a l  v a l u e d  
" a t t r a c t i o n "  w i t h  t h e  p r o p e r t i e s :  ( 1 )  a t t r a c t i o n  is  non- 
n e g a t i v e ,  ( 2 )  two s e l l e r s  w i t h  e q u a l  a t t r a c t i o n  have  e q u a l  
m a r k e t  - h a r e ,  ( 3 )  t h e  m a r k e t  s h a r e  f o r  a  g i v e n  s e l l e r  w i l l  
be  a f f e c t e d  i n  t h e  same manner i f  t h e  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  any 
o t h e r  s e l l e r  i s  i n c r e a s e d  by a  f i x e d  amount .  
A theorem p r o v e n  s t a t e s  t h a t  i f  t h e  r e l a t i o n  between 
s h a r e  and a t t r a c t i o n  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  above  a s s u m p t i o n s ,  t h e n  
s h a r e  e q u a l s  a t t r a c t i o n  d i v i d e d  by t o t a l  a t t r a c t i o n .  
I n s o f a r  a s  m a r k e t i n g  f a c t o r s  c a n  be a s s e m b l e d  i n t o  a n  a t t r a c -  
t i o n  f u n c t i o n  t h a t  s a t i s f i e s  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n s ,  t h e  theorem 
p r o v i d e s  a  method f o r  m o d e l l i n g  m a r k e t  s h a r e .  
I .  I n t r o d u c t i o n  
- 
M a r k e t i n g  model b u i l d e r s  f r e q u e n t l y  u s e  r l e l a t i o n s h i p s  o f  
t h e  form ( u s ) / ( u s  + them)  t o  e x p r e s s  t h e  e f f e c t s  of  " u s "  
v a r i a b l e s  on p u r c h a s e  p r o b a b i l i t y  and marke t  s h a r e .  For  
example ,  Hlavac  and L i t t l e  [l] h y p o t h e s i z e  t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  I 
o f  a c a r  b u y e r  w i l l  p u r c h a s e  h i s  c a r  a t  a  g i v e n  d e a l e r  i s  t h e  I 
r a t i o  o f  t h e  d e a l e r ' s  a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  ( w h i c h  depends  on v a r i o u s  I 
- - - - - - - - - - 
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d e a l e r  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s )  t o  t h e  sum of  t h e  same q u a n t i t i e s  
o v e r  a l l  d e a l e r s .  Urban [2], i n  h i s  new p r o d u c t  model SPRINTER, 
makes t h e  s a l e s  r a t e  o f  a b r a n d  i n  a  s t o r e  depend  on  t h e  r a t i o  
o f  a f u n c t i o n  o f  c e r t a i n  b r a n d  v a r i a b l e s  t o  t h e  sum o f  s u c h  
f u n c t i o n s  a c r o s s  b r a n d s .  Kuehn and  Weiss  [3] make u s e  o f  
( u s ) / ( u s  + them) f o r m u l a t i o n s  i n  a m a r k e t i n g  game mode l ,  
as d o e s  K o t l e r  L4] i n  a m a r k e t  s i m u l a t i o n .  Mills [5] and  
Fr iSdman [6] employ m o d e l s  o f  t h i s  f o r m  i n  g a m e - t h e o r e t i c  
a n a l y s e s  o f  c o m p e t i t i o n .  Urban [7] a n d  Lambin [8] f i t  s imilar  
mode l s  t o  e m p i r i c a l  d a t a ,  Urban t o  a  p r o d u c t  s o l d  i n  s u p e r -  
m a r k e t s  a n d  Lambin t o  a  g a s o l i n e  m a r k e t .  
I n  a l l  t h e s e  c a s e s  t h e  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  f o r m u l a t i o n  i s  t o  
b r i n g  a c o m p e t i t i v e  e f f e c t  i n t o  t h e  model  b y  s i m p l e  n o r m a l i z a -  
t i o n .  T h a t  i s ,  a  q u a n t i t y ,  l e t  u s  c a l l  it a t t r a c t i o n ,  i s  
d e f i n e d  t h a t  r e l a t e s  o n l y  t o  m a r k e t i n g  a c t i o n s  a n d  u n c o n t r o l l e d  
v a r i a b l e s  o f  a s p e c i f i c  s e l l i n g  e n t i t y .  Then,  b y  a d d i n g  
a t t r a c t i o n s  o v e r  s e l l e r s  and u s i n g  t h e  sum a s  a d e n o m i n a t o r ,  
a  m a r k e t  s h a r e  i s  o b t a i n e d  f o r  e a c h  s e l l e r .  The r e s u l t  i s  
a c o m p e t i t i v e  mode l ,  s i n c e  a n y  s e l l e r ' s  m a r k e t  s h a r e  d e p e n d s  
on t h e  a c t i o n s  o f  e v e r y  o t h e r  s e l l e r .  Time l a g s ,  m a r k e t  s e g -  
m e n t a t i o n  o r  o t h e r  phenomena may s u b s e q u e n t l y  b e  added s o  as 
b e t t e r  t o  r e p r e s e n t  o t h e r  m a r k e t  f e a t u r e s .  
T h i s  a p p r o a c h  t o  c o m p e t i t i o n  s o l v e s  a di lemma f o r  t h e  
model  b u i l d e r .  Suppose  h e  b e l i e v e s ,  f o r  e x a m p l e ,  t h a t  s a l e s -  
men a f f e c t  s a l e s .  He c a n  draw up a r e l a t i o n  b e t w e e n  s a l e s  
a n d  s a l e s  e f f o r t  a n d  t r y  t o  c a l i b r a t e  i t  w i t h  f i e l d  d a t a .  
However, c o m p e t i t i v e  a c t i o n s  c l e a r l y  a f f e c t  what  h a p p e n s  
a n d  t h e  model b u i l d e r  seems t o  need a  new r e l a t i o n s h i p  f o r  
e a c h  p o s s i b l e  l e v e l  o f  a c t i v i t y  o f  e a c h  c o m p e t i t o r .  The 
p r o b l e m  h a s  s u d d e n l y  become v e r y  c o m p l i c a t e d .  Y e t ,  i t  seems 
p l a u s i b l e  t h a t  t h e  s a l e s m e n ' s  e f f o r t s  c a n  b e  viewed as en-  
h a n c i n g  t h e  s e l l e r ' s  p o s i t i o n  w i t h  t h e  c u s t o m e r s  on some 
a b s o l u t e  s c a l e .  T h i s  c a n  t h e n  i n t e r a c t  w i t h  t h e  e f f e c t s  
c r e a t e d  by o t h e r  s e l l e r s  m e a s u r e s  on c o m p a r a b l e  a b s o l u t e  
s c a l e s .  The l i n e a r  n o r m a l i z a t i o n  o f f e r s  a way t o  r e p r e s e n t  
t h e  i n t e r a c t i o n .  
Normal ized  a t t r a c t i o n  mode l s  o f  t h i s  t y p e  c a n  b e  p o s t u l a -  
t e d  d i r e c t l y ,  b u t  i t  i s  o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  examine  them more 
c l o s e l y  and  a s k  what  b a s i c  a s s u m p t i o n s  c a n  b e  u s e d  t o  d e r i v e  
them.  We s h a l l  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  u n d e r  c e r t a i n  c o n d i t i o n s  
s u c h  a n o r m a l i z a t i o n  i s  m a t h e m a t i c a l l y  r e q u i r e d .  
The p r e s e n t  p a p e r  d e a l s  w i t h  s h a r e ,  w h e r e a s  s a l e s  a r e  
a l s o  a needed  o u t p u t  i n  most  m a r k e t i n g  m o d e l s .  A common 
a p p r o a c h  i s  t o  r e l a t e  t o t a l  m a r k e t  s a l e s  t o  t o t a l  m a r k e t i n g  
e f f o r t ,  t h e r e b y  b r e a k i n g  t h e  model b u i l d i n g  t a s k  i n t o  t h e  
two p a r t s .  However, o n l y  t h e  f i r s t  p a r t  w i l l  b e  s t u d i e d  h e r e .  
I 
I t  s h o u l d  a l s o  b e  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  t h e r  a p p r o a c h e s  
t o  m o d e l l i n g  c o m p e t i t i v e  i n t e r a c t i o n .  F o r  one  s u c h  s e e  
L i t t l e  [g]. 
11. Prob lem D e f i n i t i o n  
Given  a f i n i t e  s e t  S = is1, ..., s n )  o f  s e l l e r s  which  
i n c l u d e s  a l l  i e l l e r s  f rom whom a g i v e n  c u s t o m e r  g r o u p  makes 
its purchases, suppose that for each seller si€S an "attraction" 
value a(si) is calculated. We suppose the competitive situa- 
tion can be completely determined by the vector of attractions 
That is, the market share m(si) of a seller is fully determined 
by 2. 
Attraction may be a function of the seller's advertising 
expenditure and effectiveness, the price of his product, 
the reputation of the company, the service given during and 
after purchase, location of retail stores and much more. 
Indeed, the attraction of an individual seller can, if we wish, 
be a function of these qualities for all the other sellers, or 
where q may be quality of service of seller j ,  might j j 
indicate seller j's price, and so on. However, one would 
hope that most of a seller's attraction would be the result 
of his own actions and most model builders have treated it 
this way. 
Since, by definition, attraction completely determines 
market share, it can be said that 
for some function f where m(si) is the market share of i 
seller i. clearly, 
and 
b u t  o t h e r w i s e  t h e  f u n c t i o n s  f i  a r e  a s  y e t  a r b i t r a r y .  
The aim h e r e  i s  t o  g i v e  c o n d i t i o n s  on t h e  r e l a t i o n s h i p  
between a t t r a c t i o n  and market s h a r e  which f o r c e  t h e  s imp le  
l i n e a r  n o r m a l i z a t i o n  model 
111. Formal Development 
The assumpt ions  a r e :  
A l :  The a t t r a c t i o n  v e c t o r  i s  non-negat ive  and non-zero ,  
A 2 :  A s e l l e r  w i t h  z e r o  a t t r a c t i o n  h a s  no market  s h a r e ,  
a .  = 0 -+ m(si)  = 0 . 
1 
A 3 :  Two s e l l e r s  w i th  equa l  a t t r a c t i o n  have  e q u a l  market 
s h a r e ,  
A4: The m a r k e t  s h a r e  o f  a  g i v e n  s e l l e r  w i l l  b e  a f f e c t e d  
i n  t h e  same manner if t h e  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  any  o t h e r  
s e l l e r  i s  i n c r e a s e d  by a  f i x e d  amount A .  M a t h e m a t i c a l l y ,  
i s  i n d e p e n d e n t  o f  j ,  where e  i s  t h e  j th  v e c t o r .  j 
Theorem. I f  a ~ a r k e t  s h a r e  i s  a s s i g n e d  t o  e a c h  s e l l e r  b a s e d  
o n l y  o n  t h e  a t t r a c t i o n  v e c t o r  and i n  s u c h  a way t h a t  assump- 
t i o n s  A 1  -A4 a r e  s a t i s f i e d ,  t h e n  m a r k e t  s h a r e  i s  g i v e n  by 
a ( s i )  
m ( s i )  = , f o r  i = 1 , 2  ,..., n . 
n  
I a ( s j )  
.j = 1 
P r o o f .  S i n c e  t h e  v e c t o r  - A c o m p l e t e l y  d e f i n e s  t h e  v e c t o r  
( m ( s l )  , . . . , m ( s n ) )  t h e n  f u n c t i o n s  f l y . .  . , f n  e x i s t  s u c h  t h a t  
m ( s i )  = f i ( g )  , f o r  a l l  i = 1,. . . , n  , 
w i t h  
a n d  
f i ( a )  1. 0 , f o r  a l l  i = 1, ..., n  . 
C o n s i d e r  t h e  s e t  
n  
a = : al i s  c o n s t a n t  and  I ai = A f o r  some A > 0 )  
i =l 
- 
L e t  g, g e a ,  a  # Y ,  t h e n  i t  w i l l  b e  shown t h a t  
from which i t  may be conc luded  t h a t  f . ( a )  is a  f u n c t i o n  o n l y  
n  
1 - 
o f  a i  and  a i .  
i=l 
0 - L e t  2 = m i n ( a , a )  t a k e n  componentwise and e  b e  t h e  j t h  j 
u n i t  v e c t o r .  Then i f  b0 i s  d e f i n e d  as t h e  s m a l l e s t  non-zero  
component o f  two v e c t o r s  ( 3  - - - a O ,  - some i and j e x i s t  
such  t h a t  we can  d e f i n e  
and  
where e i t h e r  
By a s sumpt ion  A 4  
-1 = 
Now d e f i n e  b1 a s  t h e  minimum non-zero  e l emen t  o f  (a - 2 ,a - 2 )  
and  form 
and  
w h e r e  e i t h e r  
-2 - = 2  = 
a i  = a i  o r  a .  = a .  . 
.I .I 
-k = -k 
S i n c e  t h e  number o f  z e r o  e l e m e n t s  o f  (a - 5 , 3 - 5 ) i n c r e a s e s  
b y  a t  l e a s t  o n e  a t  e a c h  i t e r a t i o n  o f  t h i s  p r o c e d u r e ,  and 
f l (ak)  = f l ( i k )  , f o r  a l l  k  , 
we h a v e  
Thus, f  (5) = f  ( a )  a s  r e q u i r e d ,  e s t a b l i s h i n g  t h e  c l a i m  t h a t  1  - 1 - 
t h e  m a r k e t  s h a r e  m ( s  ) i s  c o n s t a n t  o v e r  t h e  s e t a  a n d  h e n c e  1 
d e p e n d s  o n l y  upon t h e  q u a n t i t i e s  a  a n d  A .  S o ,  i n  g e n e r a l ,  1 
we wil' e x p r e s s  f . ( a )  i n  t h e  fo rm f i ( a i , A ) .  By A3 1 - 
so t h a t  
f i  = f .  f o r  a l l  i,j = 1 ,..., n  . 
.J ' 
Now s u p p o s e  by c o n t r a d i c t i o n  t h a t ,  f o r  any f i x e d  a and A ,  
Assume X > a/A:, t h e  c a s e  X < a/A being s imi lar .  
C o n s i d e r  two v e c t o r s  5,; where  
a n d  b y  (1) 
s o  t h a t  by ( 3 )  and ( 4 )  
f i ( a / k , A )  = h/k  . 
Now c o n s i d e r  a v e c t o r  2 w i t h  
ai = a / k  , i = 1, ... , n  - 1 , 
a n d  
where  
Hence,  t h e r e  i s  a  c o n t r a d i c t i o n  i f  k  a n d  n  c a n  b e  c h o s e n  s u c h  
t h a t  
( n -  l ) X / k  > 1 , 
and 
T h a t  i s ,  i f  
o r  
a/A < k / n  - 1 < X . 
- ( 5 )  
O b v i o u s l y ,  ( 5 )  can.  b e  s a t i s f i e d  f o r  some v a l u e s  o f  n  a n d  k .  
Hence, 
and t h e  theorem is  proved.  
I V .  P i s c u s s i o n  
The key p o i n t  o f  t h e  mathemat ica l  a n a l y s i s  i s  t h a t ,  
s u b j e c t  t o  c e r t a i n  b a s i c  assumpt ions  r e l a t i n g  t h e  v e c t o r  q u a n t i -  1 
t y ,  a t t r a c t i o n ,  t o  t h e  s c a l a r  q u a n t i t y ,  market s h a r e ,  mathema- 
t i c a l  c o n s i s t e n c y  i m p l i e s  t h a t  market s h a r e  i s  a  s imp le  l i n e a r  I 
n o r m a l i z a t i o n  o f  a t t r a c t i o n .  Let us look a t  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  
o f  t h e  assumpt ions  used .  
Assumptions A 1  and A 2  a r e  r a t h e r  i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l  and made 
t o  s i m p l i f y  t h e  a n a l y s i s .  A 2  s t a t e s  t h a t  s e l l e r s  w i th  z e r o  
a t t r a c t i o n  w i l l  have no market s h a r e .  A 1  r e q u i r e s  a t t r a c t i o n  
t o  be non-negative and s a y s  t h e  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  a t  l e a s t  one 
f i r m  must be p o s i t i v e .  Otherwise t h e r e  would he no a c t i v e  
s e l l e r s  i n  t h e  market .  Assumption A3 does  have some subs t ance  
I t  s a y s  t h a t  i f  two competing s e l l e r s  have equa l  a t t r a c t i o n ,  
t hen  they  w i l l  have an  e q u a l  s h a r e  o f  t h e  market .  I f  a t t r a c -  
t i o n  were s imply de f ined  a s  a d v e r t i s i n g ,  f o r  i n s t a n c e ,  t h e n  one , 
could  a rgue  a g a i n s t  A3 i n  many c a s e s .  C l e a r l y ,  t h e r e  a r e  o t h e r  I 
f a c t o r s  which i n f l u e n c e  market s h a r e .  Thus, A 3  h e l p s  make I 
c l e a r  t o  t h e  model b u i l d e r  what he must i n c l u d e  i n  h i s  a t t r a c -  
I 
t i o n  f u n c t i o n  t o  o b t a i n  a  s e n s i b l e  r e s u l t  from t h e  model. 
A c r u c i a l  assumpt ion  i s  ~ 4 .  It s t a t e s  t h a t  i f  t h e  a t t r a c -  
t i o n  o f  a  compe t i to r  of  si i v c r e a s e s  by some amount A ,  t h e n  
t h e  new market  s h a r e  of  si w i l l  n o t  depend on which c o m p e t i t o r  
made t h e  i n c r e a s e .  A 4  does  n o t  s ay  t h e  marke t  s h a r e  of  s i  
would remain  f i x e d .  I n t u i t i v e l y ,  we would e x p e c t ,  i n  f a c t ,  
a  d rop  i n  s e l l e r  i ' s  s h a r e  i f  c o m p e t i t o r s  i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r  
a t t r a c t i o n .  Is A 4  r e a s o n a b l e ?  
We can  t h i n k  of two p o s s i b l e  s o u r c e s  o f  d e v i a t i o n s  
f r o r  A 4 :  n o n l i n e a r t ~  and asymmetry. N o n l i n e a r i t y  would b e  e v i -  
denced i f  add ing  an  increment  t o  a  s m a l l  a t t r a c t i o n  produced 
a  d i f f e r e n t  e f f e c t  ( o n  o t h e r s )  from add ing  t h e  same amount t o  
a  l a r g e  a t t r a c t i o n .  To some extent!, however ,  t h i s  i s  a  m a t t e r  
of t h e  s c a l e  a l o n g  which a t t r a c t i o n  i s  measured.  There  i s  a 
c l e a r  advan t age  i f  a t t r a c t i o n  i s  a d d i t i v e  i n  t h e  s e n s e  o f  A 4 .  
Asymmetry c o u l d  a r i s e  i f  changes i n  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  one 
s e l l e r  were d i f f e r e n t i a l l y  e f f e c t i v e  on t h e  cus tomers  of  
a n o t h e r .  Aspec ts  o f  asymmetry can  be  f o r m a l l y  c o n s i d e r e d  i n  
t h e  l i n e a r  n o r m a l i z a t i o n  model by making a t t r a c t i o n  o f  s e l l e r  
i p a r t i a l l y  dependent  on some o f  t h e  q u a l i t i e s  o f  s e l l e r  . 
However, i n  g e n e r a l ,  o u r  assumpt ions  do n o t  accommoaa+ P asvrrnet,ry 
and ,  an  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  t h e o r y  would be r e q u i r e d .  I n  some 
s i t u a t i o n s  market  s egmen ta t i on  would be  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  l e p r e s e n t  
asymmetr ic  e f f e c t s .  Thus a  marke t i ng  a c t i o n  may i n c r e a s e  
a t t r a c t i v e n e s s  more i n  one group  t h a n  a n o t h e r  ( f o r  example,  
a  s p o r t i e r  c a r  may a p p e a l  more t o  younger  p e o p l e ) .  The a l g e b r a  
o f  market  s e g m e n t a t i o n  i s  d e s c r i b e d  below. 
To u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  i m p l i c a t i o n s  of  t h e  theorem f u r t h e r ,  
we p r e s e n t  two c o r o l l a r i e s .  However, e i t h e r  o f  them cou ld  be  
made a s  a n  a s sumpt ion  t o  r e p l a c e  A 4 .  Then A 4  would f o l l o w  a s  
a  c o r o l l a r y .  
C 1 :  The market  s h a r e  o f  s e l l e r  i depends  o n l y  on h i s  
a t t r a c t i o n  ai and t h e  sum o f  a l l  a t t r a c t i o n s .  
C2: I f  t h e  a t t r a c t i o n  r f  s e l l e r  i i n c r e a s e s  by a n  
amount A and i f  t h e  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  s e l l e r  j d e c r e a s e s  
by t h e  same amount A ,  w h i l e  t h e  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  a l l  
o t h e r  s e l l e r s  s k ,  k # i,j, r ema ins  t h e  same, t h e n  
t h e  marke t  s h a r e  o f  s e l l e r s  sk ,  k  # i , j ,  r ema ins  
c o n s t a n t .  
C o r o l l a r y  C 1  s a y s  t h a t  i n  c o n s i d e r i n g  t h e  marke t  s h a r e  o f  
s e l l e r  i ,  one can  a g g r e g a t e  t h e  o t h e r  s e l l e r s  t o g e t h e r ,  t a k e  
t h e i r  a g g r e g a t e d  a t t r a c t i o n  t o  b e  t h e  sum o f  t h e i r  i n d i v i d u a l  
a t t r a c t i o n s ,  and t h e n  f o c u s  on s e l l e r  i v e r s u s  t h e  r e s t .  
C o r o l l a r y  C2 i s  s imi l a r  i n  s p i r i t  b u t  l e s s  encompass ing .  
C2 i s  l o c a l ,  whereas  C 1  i s  g l o b a l .  One p o i n t  wor th  n o t i n g  
i s  t h a t  A 4  is  an  a s sumpt ion  conce rned  w i t h  what happens  when 
t h e  t o t a l  a t t r a c t i o n ,  i . e . ,  t h e  sum, i n c r e a s e s .  The a l t e r n a -  
t i v e s  C 1  and  C2, on t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  c o n c e r n  t h e  r e a c t i o n  o f  
t h e  marke t  when t o t a l  a t t r a c t i o n  r ema ins  c o n s t a n t .  
Cons ide r a t , i ons  f o r  Model B u i l d e r s .  The main p o i n t  f o r  model 
b u i l d e r s  i s  t h a t  a s i m p l e  model which f o c u s e s  on t h e  a t t r i b u t e s  
of  a s i n g l e  s e l l e r ,  i s  s u f f i c i e n t l y  r i c h  t o  model a  f u l l y  
c o m p e t i t i v e  ma rke t .  
I t  i s  i n s t r u c t i v e  t o  p o i n t  o u t  an  a p p e a l i n g  method t h a t  
c a n n o t  b e  u sed  t o  deduce  t h e  n o r m a l i z a t i o n  model .  A t  f i r s t  
g l a n c e  i t  a p p e a r s  t h a t ,  s i n c e  marke t  s h a r e  i s ,  by d e f i n i t i o n ,  
t h e  r a t i o  o f  s a l e s  t o  t o t a l  s a l e s ,  i t  would be  s u f f i c i e n t  t o  
assume t h a t  s a l e s  a r e  p r o p o r t i o n a l  t o  t h e  s e l l e r ' s  a t t r a c t i o n  
f u n c t i o n .  C a l c u l a t i o n  of  s h a r e  immedia te ly  g i v e s  t h e  normal i -  
z a t i o n  model. However, t h i s  w i l l  only be  v a l i d  i n  a  t o t a l l y  
non-compet i t ive  market  where t h e  marke t ing  a c t i v i t i e s  of  one 
s e l l e l -  do not  influence t h e  s a l e s  of  a n o t h e r .  I f ,  f o r  example,  
t h e  market  i s  o f  f i x e d  s i z e  i n  t o t a l  s a l e s ,  i n d i v i d u a l  s a l e s  
cannot  be  l i n e a r  w i t h  t h e  a t t r a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n .  Fur thermore ,  
s a l e s  cannot  be independent  of  c o m p e t i t i v e  a t t r a c t i o n .  
No t i ce  w e  have no t  deduced any s p e c i f i c  r e s u l t s  about  
market  b e h a v i o r ,  b u t  r a t h e r  some mathemat ica l  r l i l e s  of  t h e  
game. Thus, i f  someone a s s e r t s  a n  a t t r a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  
depending  on, s a y ,  a d v e r t i s i n g  and p r i c e ,  and i t  i s  wrong, 
t h e n  t h e  c a l c u l a t i o n  o f  market  s h a r e s  w i l l  be  wrong. Once 
a t t r a c t i o n  i s  s p e c i f i e d ,  however, we can answer such  q u e s t i o n s  
a s  what i s  t h e  impact  on market  s h a r e  of  i n c r e m e n t a l  changes 
i n  p r i c e  o r  a d v e r t i s i n g  o r  any o f  t h e  o t h e r  f a c t o r s  composing 
a t t r a c t i o n .  
Another  i n t e r e s t i n g  a s p e c t  o f  t h i s  model i s  t h e  q u a n t i t y  
A ,  t h e  t o t a l  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  t h e  s e l l e r s .  One might  c o n s t r u c t  
a  model o f  t h e  s i z e  of t h e  market  a s  a  f u n c t i o n  o f  A .  Cornbin- 
Ing t h i s  w i t h  t h e  market  s h a r e ,  one cou ld  c a l c u l a t e  f o r  a  
g iven  s e l l e r  t h e  t o t a l  i n c r e a s e  i n  h i s  number of  s a l e s  g e n e r a t e d  
by i n c r e a s e s  i n  a t t r a c t i o n .  P a r t  o f  t h e s e  new s a l e s  would be 
due t o  a n  i n c r e a s e d  market  s i z e  and p a r t  t o  a n  i n c r e a s e d  
market  s h a r e .  I n  f a c t ,  one could  c o n s i d e r  A1, A*, ... A t o  
TI! 
be  t h e  a t t r a c t i o n s  o f  a  number of  d i f f e r e n t  p roduc t  c l a s s e s  
which compete w i t h  each o t h e r  f o r  consumers. For  i n s t a n c e ,  
A may r e p r e s e n t  t h e  t o t a l  a t t r a c t i o n  o f  r a d i o s ,  A2 t e l e v i s i o n  1 
s e t s ,  A s t e r e o  s y s t e m s ,  and s o  o n .  One migh t  p o s t u l a t e  a  3 
d i f f e r e n t  model f o r  comput ing  t h e  s h a r e  o f  t h e  e l e c t r o n i c  
media marke t  h e l d  by e a c h  o f  t h e s e  p r o d u c t  c l a s s e s .  Combining 
t h i s  w i t h  o u r  model f o r  i n d i v i d u a l  s e l l e r s  w i t h i n  a  segment  
p r o v i d e s  a more s o p h i s t i c a t e d  c o m p e t i t i v e  model.  
Assumptions A1 - A 4  e s s e n t i a l l y  make a ( - )  a n  u n n o r m a l i z e d  
p r o b a b i l i t y  f u n c t i o r ,  or1 t h e  s e t  of  s e l l e r s .  F o r  a n  a l t e r n a -  
t i v e  a x i o m a t i o n  t h a t  c l o s e l y  p a r a l l e l s  p r o b a b i l i t y ,  s e e  t h e  
Appendix.  Market s h a r e ,  on t h e  o t h e r  hand ,  s a t i s f i e s  a l l  t h e  
axioms o f  p r o b a b i l i - t y  t h e o r y  and  s o ,  m a t h e m a t i c a l l y  s p e a k i n g ,  
is a  p r o b a b i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  d e f i n e d  on t h e  s e t  o f  s e l l e r s .  The 
s t a t e m e n t  o f  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n s  a n d  t h e  r e s u l t s  i s  i n  t e r m s  o f  
marke t  s h a r e ,  b u t  t h e  t e r m  " p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  p u r c h a s e "  c o u l d  
c l e a r l y  b e  s u b s t i t u t e d  w i t h o u t  a f f e c t i n g  t h e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  de-  
ve lopment .  N o t i c e  t h a '  t h e  r e s u l t s  r e f e r  t o  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  
p u r c h a s e  from a  s e l l e r  g i v e n  t h a t  a p u r c h a s e  w i l l  b e  made. 
I n  o t h e r  words ,  t h e  sum o f  t h e  p u r c h a s e  p r o b a b i l i t i e s  is  
presumed t o  be o n e .  O b v i o u s l y ,  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  o f  no p u r c h a s e  
c a n  be  i n t r o d u c e d  as a n  e x t e n s i o n  o f  t h e  model .  
The f a c t  t h a t  marke t  s h a r e  h a s  t h e  m a t h e m a t i c a l  p r o p e r t i e s  
o f  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  c a n  b e  h e l p f u l  i n  v a r i o u s  ways. F o r  example,  
i f  s e v e r a l  c u s t o m e r  g r o u p s  o r  m a r k e t s  segments  a r e  i d e n t i f i e d ,  
t h e  c o n c e p t  o f  c o n d i t i o n a l  m a r k e t  s h a r e  becomes u s e f u l .  L e t  
c = I c  . , c  ) = a  s e t  o f  r c u s t o m e r  g r o u p s ,  1'" r 
a ( s i  ( c .  ) = a t t r a c t i o n  o f  s e l l e r  s w i t h i n  c u s t o m e r  
J i 
g r o u p  j,  
and 
p ( c . 1  J = p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t o t a l  s a l e s  coming f rom 
c u s t o m e r  g r o u p  c  j 
Then a s s u m i n g  t h a t  A 1  - A 4  h o l d  f o r  e a c h  c u s t o m e r  g r o u p ,  t h e  
m a r k e t  s h a r e  o f  s i  w i t h i n  c u s t o m e r  g r o u p  j is  
and  s o  t h e  ' o t a l  marke t  s h a r e  i s  
By p a r t i t i o n i n g  t h e  p o p u l a t i o n  i n t o  g r o u p s  o r  s e g m e n t s  a  
complex model c a n  be b u i l t  up f rom s i m p l e  e l e m e n t s .  D i f f e r e n t  
m a r k e t i n g  v a r i a b l e s ,  s a y ,  p r i c e ,  p r o m o t i o n ,  a d v e r t i ~ i r ~ g ,  and 
d i s t r i  u t i o n ,  may impinge  d i f f e r e n t l y  on d i f f e r e n t  s e g m e n t s ,  
which  may, i n  t u r n ,  r e s p o n d  d i f f e r e n t l y .  The r e s p o n s e s  would 
d e f i n e  a  r e l a t i v e  a t t r a c t i o n  f u n c t i o n  which  would t h e n  b e  
a s s e m b l e d  a s  shown above .  Thus ,  t h e  a d o p t i o n  o f  a b a s i c  
n o r m a l i z e d  a t t r a c t i o n  model  d o e s  n o t  mean t h a t  a l l  s h a r e  
e x p r e s s i o n s  end up as s i m p l e  r a t i o s .  
APPENDIX 
Attraction As An Unnormalized Probability 
An alternative axiomization of the linear normalized 
market share model brings out the close mathematical connec- 
tion between attraction and probability theorv. 
Let 
S = isl, . . . ,  sn} = set of all sellers 
SC S = a subset of sellers 
a(S) = attraction of a subset of sellers. 
A sufficient set of axioms is: 
B1: Attraction is non-negative, 
B2: The attraction of a subset of sellers is the sum 
of the attractions of the sellers in the subset, 
I 
B3: a(si) is finite for all sics and a(si) > 0 
for at least one si. 
B4: If two subsets of sellers have equal attractions, 
their market shares are equal, 
The proof of the market share theorem is much the same 
a s  b e f o r e .  The i n t e r m e d i a t e  r e s u l t  
c an  be  o b t a i n e d  a s  f o l l o w s .  Def ine  
- 
For _a = g, 
T h e r e f o r e ,  d e n o t i n g  t h e  marke t  s h a r e  of  S  g i v e n  a  = a '  by 
- - 
m(SI_a = 2'1, 
and s o  
as d e s i r e d .  The argument t h a t  f i ( a )  c an  be w r i t t e n  f i ( a , A )  
and f i  = f .  f o r  a l l  i , j  i s  t h e  same. S i n c e  by B2 and B4 
J 
t h e r e  i s  a n  e q u i v a l e n c e  between a  s i n g l e  s e l l e r  and a  s e t  o f  
s e l l e r s  w i t h  t h e  same t o t a l  a t t r a c t i o n ,  we can  e x t e n d  t h e  
n o t a t i o n  t o  f S ( a , A )  and f S  = f i  = f .  f o r  a l l  i , j , S .  J 
By d e f i n i t i o n  a ( S )  = A and m(S) = 1 s o  t h a t  f i (A,A) = 
f ( A , A )  = 1. Consider  a  s e l l e r ,  say  s l ,  w i t h  z e r o  a t t r a c t i o n .  L e t  S  
S  = { s ~ ~ . . . , s ~ ) ,  t hen  
and s o  fl(O,A) = 0 .  This  e s t a b l i s h e s  ( 4 )  wi thou t  assuming 
A * .  The r e s t  of  t h e  proof  i s  t h e  same. 
Axioms B 1  and R 2  a r e  two of t h e  t h r e e  axioms o f  f i n i t e  
sample space  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h e o r y .  (See ,  f o r  example, Parzen 
[lo] . )  The t h i r d  p r o b a b i l i t y  axiom i s  t h a t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  
o f  a  c e r t a i n  even t  i s  1. B3 s t a t e s  two p r o p e r t i e s  imp l i ed  by 
t h i s ,  namely, f i n i t e n e s s  and a t  l e a s t  one p o s i t i v e  v a l u e ,  bu t  
s t o p s  s h o r t  of  t h e  u n i t y  n o r m a l i z a t i o n .  Thus B 1  - B3 c r e a t e  
a t t r a c t i o n  a s  an  unnormalized p r o b a b i l i t y  f u n c t i o n .  ~4 makes 
t h e  connec t ion  t o  s h a r e .  Share  i t s e l f  s a t i s f i e s  a l l  t h e  axioms 
o f  p r o b a b i l i t y  and s o  i s  a  p r o b a b i l i t y  f u n c t i o n  d e f i n e d  on t h e  
s e t  o f  s e l l e r s .  
The ax iomiza t ion  B 1  - n!l i s  very  a p p e a l i n g  b u t  was no t  
chosen a s  t h e  b a s i c  apprqach because  i t  i n t r o d u c e s  t h e  
a d d i t i v i t y  assumpt ion  by means o f  t h e  a t t r a c t i o n  of a  s e t  of  
s e l l e r s .  The concept  o f  t h e  a t t r a c t i o n  of  a  s e t  seems a  l i t t l e  
a r t i f i c i a l .  This  i s  because  a t t r a c t i o n  has  been d i s c u s s e d  a s  
a  p r o p e r t y  o f  an  i n d i v i d u a l  s e l l e r  and, a l t hough  o u r  f i n a l  
r e s u l t  i m p l i e s  t h a t  t h e  concept  can be extended t o  s e t s  i t  
seems more n a t u r a l  t o  have t h i s  a s  a  deduc t ion  t h a n  an assump- 
t i o n .  The approach chosen i s  t o  use  ~ 4 ,  which e x p r e s s e s  addi -  
t i v i t y  i n  te rms of  increments  o f  an i n d i v i d u a l  s e l l e r s '  a t t r a c -  
t i o n  s o  t h a t  no concept  of c o l l e c t i v e  a t t r a c t i o n  i s  r e q u i r e d .  
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